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Abstract
Globalization is a dynamic, transboundary force challenging the Westphalian model of state-dominated
geopolitics that has dominated world affairs for nearly 400 years. Equally problematic to state-centric
international relations is global climate change, an environmental calamity that is increasingly being
recognized as a threat to state security, yet cannot be solved by traditional diplomatic or military means.
Consequently, an array of sub-national actors are becoming more influential in all areas of global
governance, including the management of the planet’s ecological commons. This paper explores how
cities are following the trajectory of this trend to establish themselves as world leaders in formulating
climate change agendas. Inconsistent efforts to draft effective climate strategies at the state and international levels are contributing to this power shift, along with the ability of metro-regions to establish global
networks dedicated to sound emissions reduction and climate planning strategies. Analysis further shows
that urban areas are important loci of economic production and commodities output, as well as key entry
points for domestic and international trade, the combination of which suggests metro-regions have the
necessary capital and political wherewithal to serve as initiators of green diplomacy. Discussion follows
concerning the specific intra-state and transnational efforts cities are taking to become catalysts for international climate action, as well as what unique challenges they face.

Introduction

taken shape, this paper will create a historical backdrop

From the columned amphitheaters of ancient Greece to

are creating the political spaces necessary for cities to

the storied halls of the United States Congress, political
discourse has shaped our collective destinies for millennia. Traditionally, this discourse has been born out of
competing paradigms attempting to define how things are,
how things should be, and how things can be changed to
satisfy an ever shifting array of human needs and desires.

illustrative of how globalization and environmental threats
become world leaders in negotiating climate planning. An
examination will follow as to why cities are the most likely
sub-national actors to fulfill this role, along with a review
of the specific steps they are taking as catalysts for international climate action in a global commons no longer
dominated by the state.

The cessation of wars has been the result of this process,
as have some of history’s greatest civil rights movements.
And while territorial conflicts and social equity matters
remain important aims for all governing bodies, political
actors have increasingly been challenged to integrate the

Westphalian Geopolitics, Globalization, and Environmental Crises

needs of the built environment into the biophysical realm,
as demonstrated by ongoing debates concerning how

International relations have long been dictated by a state-

greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions should be regulated.

centric form of geopolitics known as the Westphalian

The dominance of GHGs in current political arenas is

System. This system is predicated on the idea that each

related, of course, to their contribution to climate change,

nation-state is a sovereign territory equal in legal stature

a severe environmental crisis that if left unabated has the

as its neighbors, and free to govern its domestic structures

potential of making “the twenty-first century . . . the age of

independent of outside intervention (Falk, 2002). Histori-

global catastrophe” (Matthew, 2010, p. 342).

cally, this political construct is acknowledged as having
its origins in the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, a series of

At first glance, it would seem a multi-national approach

treaties born out of the ashes of Europe’s Thirty Years’ War

toward curtailing GHGs would be an appropriate and

(Ruggie, 1993). As a consequence of these proceedings,

sensible strategy, especially since the atmosphere is a ubiq-

European dignitaries came to recognize a more clearly

uitous resource shared by all peoples. Such an approach

legitimized notion of sovereignty where the state sup-

fits neatly into the Westphalian model of state-dominated

planted previous medieval organizational forms as hav-

governance that has held sway for nearly four centuries

ing the greatest authority within its territorial boundaries.

(Segbers, 2011). Despite these considerations, it is actu-

Initially, this sovereignty-based, state-centric approach to

ally cities that are quickly becoming the most important

governance was viewed as a necessary step if Europe was

players in global environmental governance. Their ascen-

to eschew decades of war in favor of a more balanced

dancy into this role is somewhat paradoxical given they

network of power (Croxton, 1999). Johan Adler Salvius, a

have traditionally been embedded within the larger body

Swedish baron present during the 1648 treaties, cogently

politic of their parent nation, a configuration that would

described the idea of European power symmetry by noting

seem to reinforce the idea that international governance is

“The first rule of politics is that the security of all depends

the exclusive domain of the state. However, extensive networks of cities active in formulating climate change agendas are challenging states for primacy in green international relations. To understand how this shift in influence has
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on the equilibrium of the individuals. When one begins

portation and communication-based technologies that

to become powerful . . . the others place themselves,

have allowed human interests to transcend physical and

through unions or alliances, into the opposite balance in

national boundaries alike. Consider that with the collapse

order to maintain the equipoise” (qtd. in Croxton, 1999,

of the Soviet Union the world is now completely encircled

p. 590). Westphalian ideas of sovereignty became

by a capitalist system “tooled by new information and

further entrenched by the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht which

communication technologies that are at the roots of new

saw its participants crystallize statist theory through their

productivity sources, of new organizational forms, and of

acknowledgment that “a defense of [power] equilibrium

the formation of a global economy” (Castells, 1999, p. 2).

should be the core concern of all” (Ruggie, 1993).

Ohmae (2008) adds technological change is a dynamic
force undermining the authority of states in what is increas-

Ultimately, Westphalian geopolitics evolved beyond the

ingly becoming a cross-border civilization, one where

European milieu to shape global relations everywhere,

far-reaching market actors will re-shape the world into

principally as a consequence of Imperial conquest and

a collection of economic zones untethered to nationalist

colonization, but also as a necessary repercussive of

designs. Segbers (2011) argues that at the very least glo-

post-World War I and II statesmen who viewed the West-

balization has created a new stratification of governance

phalian model as being the geopolitical archetype most

where global institutions, states, and sub-national players

suitable for keeping world relations intact (Falk, 2002).

are now intertwined amongst one another in a new politics

Accordingly, Westphalian sovereignty is often viewed as

of scale which is as complex vertically as it is horizontally.

the progenitor of modern political realism where state
capacity and survival are seen as priorities for world lead-

The rapid pace by which these economic, social, and geo-

ers who must seek to enhance their own national interests

political changes are occurring has created a melting-pot

while keeping the aggressive tendencies of other self-

scenario for nation-states where their markets, finances,

interested states at bay through alliances and the devel-

and cultural norms are becoming bit pieces in a newly

opment of potent economic and military factors (Ruggie,

emerging political economy that does not recognize long

1993.). While it is debatable whether or not Westphalian

held ideas of state sovereignty. As a result, globalization

thinking has lessened or worsened the world’s reoccur-

is eroding the Westphalian model’s long-lived, atomistic

ring spates of political turbulence, it is generally agreed

makeup of the world, replacing it with a mosaic of state

that statism is and has been the dominant means by

and non-state actors who are finding an increasing num-

which the international community maps its diplomatic

ber of footholds in an ever shifting geopolitical landscape

orientation. Yet despite its significance in shaping world

(Dierwechter, 2013). Lemos and Agrawal (2006) argue

affairs, there is a growing sense the Westphalian model

globalization has completely re-organized the nation-state

is being reconfigured by two of the 21st century’s most

as a governing apparatus, creating a rescaled political

transformative agents: globalization and environmental

space that transfers power upward to supranational agen-

crisis.

cies such as the United Nations even as it diffuses power
downward to regional and local players. And while it is

As a complex, worldwide process for economic integra-

unlikely globalization will completely erase state borders

tion and societal interchange, globalization has enabled
the fluid translocation of people, finance, ideologies, and
commodities. Appadurai (2008) believes this worldwide
ebb and flow of diverse forces is a consequence of trans-
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anytime soon, it is clear a post-Westphalian schema is

The ability of pollution to seep across geographic bound-

emerging where traditional players such as nation-states

aries has led to a broad shift from the international

are no longer the sole arbiters of governance and policy-

community’s usual preoccupation with state-to-state

making, even as today’s relentless diaspora of people,

aggression; instead, territorially fixed governments must

money, goods, and ideas is opening new political spaces

now contend with non-traditional security threats rooted

for non-state actors such as cities.

in environmental crisis (Mathews, 1997). Episodes like
Chernobyl and the 2011 Fukushima nuclear reactor

Unlike globalization, environmental threats have taken

breach have certainly cemented this reality for territorially

longer to alter the landscape of international relations de-

fixed states who find themselves caught in the path of ra-

spite the fact they have plagued human societies for most

diation contaminated air and water. Karkkainen (2004)

of recorded history. Diamond (2005) asserts a failure to

likens such transboundary calamities as harbingers of

adequately address deforestation and soil erosion led to

a post-Westphalian system of international governance,

the collapse of the ancient Maya. Similar issues haunted

clarifying that “Although states remain . . . important

the Anasazi of southwest North America who completely

actors in the global arena and within their own territorial

razed the region’s hardwood groves, mismanaged an

jurisdictions, sovereign states themselves have come to

over-extended irrigation system, and, as a consequence,

recognize that some environmental problems lie beyond

were forced to abandon lands they had occupied for

the limits of ordinary state competence, too complex to

nearly five hundred years (Ibid.). On the surface it would

be resolved through straightforward exercises of state sov-

seem as if these types of large-scale environmental ca-

ereignty” (p. 74). Nowhere is this potential for geopoliti-

lamities would decrease over time as advancements in

cal re-orientation more evident than in the penultimate

scientific theory and technology have combined to provide

environmental crisis of our time: global climate change.

a breathtaking array of knowledge and tools. However,
this does not seem to be the case given environmental
crises now stalk unabated across all seven continents.
From undrinkable water to roiling clouds of noxious
fumes, modern communities appear every bit as inept at
managing their natural environs as their ill-fated ances-

Global Climate Change, Urban
Realities, and the International Response

tors. Dierwechter (2013) reports that until the end of the
19th century, past and modern societies shared another

With its capacity to transform entire biomes, raise

commonality: these issues were never a matter of transna-

oceans above existing seaboards, and intensify inclem-

tional interest. This would change with industrialization,

ent weather patterns worldwide, global climate change

however, as factory caused effluence and air pollution

has been acknowledged by the international scientific

began modifying the planet’s waters and atmosphere at

community as the most pressing concern human societ-

unprecedented rates. Soon, one person’s toxic waste be-

ies face today (IPCC, 2013). When considering global

came everyone’s as streams, oceans, and winds circulated

climate change’s impacts on natural systems, it is pru-

pollution around the globe on an epic scale. States were

dent to remember humankind’s fate is directly tethered

quickly placed in the uncomfortable position of not only
having to be accountable for their own industrial habits,
but to also watchdog those of their neighbors.
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to ecological outcomes. Recognition of this has forced

half of the world’s population currently lives in cities with

political leaders to come to grips with the fact that climate

this amount expected to reach 80% by 2050 (Toly, 2011).

change is every bit a danger to human infrastructures and

From a planning and mitigation standpoint, this shift in

well-being as it is to ecosystems. Matthew (2010) uses a

human distribution cannot be understated, for it speaks

potent cause-effect linkage to summarize these threats (see

to a newly emerging global cartography that places cities

Figure 1):

[Figure 1]
Expanded ranges for disease vectors, intensified heat waves, decreased livability due to
a combination of environmental stressors

Untenable strains placed on health care
systems, and increased mortality rates in
regions unable to adequately prepare or

Mass Migration of humans as a consequence of flooding, drought, and severe
weather

Violent conflicts over the possession of, and
access to, water, food, energy, and other
finite resources

Large-scale, reactionary efforts to address
these issues via engineering, military intervention, and massive inputs of labor

Economic hardship on a global scale due to
widespread market collapse and re-allocation of state and international resources

All told these scenarios pose innumerable risks that might

at the foreground of environmental issues. Accordingly, a

further destabilize areas already under duress from weak

multi-disciplined methodology has taken root where social,

economies, political unrest, military strife, and poorly man-

health, and biophysical scientists are working collabora-

aged infrastructures (Ibid.). These realities are salient, for

tively to study the impacts climate change will have on the

they remind us the Westphalian system of state sovereignty

urban environment. This holistic approach toward as-

was created to safeguard against state-to-state aggression,

sessing potential risks captures the interdependent nature

and offers no benefit to nations facing a shapeless, amor-

of human health, ecosystems, and socioeconomic vitality,

phous threat of complex etiology such as global climate

and reflects a new urgency in determining how cities are

change.

likely to fare in the wake of global climate change. It also
reflects the broader contours by which climate change is

Evaluation models for how climate change might affect hu-

now being evaluated, namely in research and scholar-

man societies have traditionally been focused on nation-

ship that is increasingly becoming weighted toward urban

states, with a sizable number of these being directed

considerations (Rosenzweig, 2010).

toward agricultural and ecosystem impacts (Rosenzweig,
2010). This trend has changed in recent years, however,
as scientists, politicians, and planners are now viewing the
effects of climate change through an increasingly urban
lens, a reprioritization that is unsurprising given nearly
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A review of empirical evidence affirms that urban popula-

tive, international action. In fact, over the past thirty years

tions will bear the brunt of climate change impacts in the

numerous multi-national forums have been held to address

coming years (Corfee-Morlot et al., 2009). Perhaps the

climate change, including such signature events as the

most widely discussed example involves the risks presented

1979 World Climate Conference, the 1988 Toronto Con-

by rising sea levels which threaten densely settled lowlands

ference, and the 1995 United Nations Climate Change

and estuarine watersheds both of which are susceptible to

Conference (Gupta, 2010). Additionally, many other

severe flooding (IPCC, 2013). McGranahan et al. (2007)

globally-tiered scientific and political gatherings similar to

report inhabitants of low elevation coastal zones will be

the 1987 Brundtland Commission have embedded climate

particularly affected by climate change given nearly two-

change within the context of broader sustainability goals

thirds of all cities with greater than five million residents

(World, 1987). While these meetings are emblematic of

occupy such areas. This translates into approximately

today’s post-WWII internationalism where multiple states

10% of the world’s population living in harm’s way of

often work together on complex, trans-boundary issues,

intractable flooding, putting them at risk for settlement

they were unprecedented for their time in that they re-

displacement, economic decline, and high mortality rates.

flected the emergence of the global climate onto the world

Perhaps equally alarming are the health implications of

political stage (Dierwechter, 2013).

poor ambient air quality, as revealed in a study conducted
by Bell et al. (2007). Various emissions projections re-

Initially, multi-national efforts to curtail GHG emissions

lated to climate change suggest urban populations will

seemed quite promising. For example, Gupta (2010)

be particularly hard hit due to increases in tropospheric

reports the 1979 World Climate Conference led to a

ozone levels during summer months, the net affect be-

number of critically important research programs, includ-

ing a rise in associated adverse health conditions such

ing the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change which

as asthma, compromised lung function, and increased

serves as a clearinghouse to review, decipher and dis-

death rates among infants and the elderly. In addition,

seminate “the most recent scientific, technical, and socio-

temperature projections for 2050 show a strong likelihood

economic information produced worldwide relevant to the

of extended periods of warmth such that mortality rates in

understanding of climate change” (IPCC, 2013). Another

U.S. metropolitan regions will see a 70% increase in heat

fruitful multi-state effort concerning the atmosphere was

stroke and heat exhaustion related deaths (Kalkstein &

the 1987 Montreal Protocol which successfully finalized an

Greene, 2007). These studies speak to the urban realities

international treaty to protect the ozone layer from harmful

of climate change, and underscore the consequences of

chlorofluorocarbons (Clapp & Dauvergne, 2011). All told,

the latter will be concentrated disproportionately among

these events heralded a new age of political governance

metropolitan regions and the people living there.

where the mettle of states to resolve complex, trans-boundary environmental problems is being continuously tested.

In recognizing the myriad threats posed by climate change,

They also signaled an acknowledgement that humankind’s

many political discussions at the national and sub-national

relationship with the atmosphere is irrevocably changing,

level have arisen to define what the most effective strate-

namely in that the latter is now a newly defined politi-

gies are for reducing GHG emissions. While currently

cal space whose chemical make-up is as dependent on

prevalent across all strata of academic and political life,
these talks were initially conducted by state dignitaries operating at global forums, since it was assumed that climate
change was a large scale problem necessitating collabora-
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anthropogenic processes as it is biophysical ones. Indeed,
since 1979 the atmosphere has become more than a thin
veil of life-supporting gases – it has become the premiere
political space for multiple actors trying to articulate an
appropriate framework of action for one of the planet’s
worst environmental problems.
While the 1987 Montreal Protocol stands as a model for
multi-state environmental governance, international attempts to address climate change have been mostly mired
in ineffectiveness since the WCC first met to discuss the
issue in 1979. The reasons for this are varied, yet certain
trends stand out as being especially problematic. First,
many of the early GHG targets set by international accords
were non-binding and often worded ambiguously. Second,
the financial assistance promised to the global South to
provide technological and developmental upgrades necessary for limiting emissions was frequently abandoned due
to the economic shortfallings of the donors. Third, the
economic collapse of middle-tiered nations such as Russia
in 1997 meant that concurrent drops in GHG emissions by
these countries demotivated them from being participants.
Lastly, many periphery nations have been reluctant to
embrace climate treaties for fear these agreements can be
used to restrict their development (Gupta, 2010). Perhaps
the worst stumbling block arose from the United States’
refusal to become a signatory of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol.
Born out of President George Bush’s reluctance to push
for a modification in American lifestyles, and matched by
an equally bullish resistance from the industrial sector, the
United States passed the Byrd-Hagel Resolution in 1997
which prohibited the U. S. from accepting “. . . any future
binding quantitative [emissions] targets until and unless
key developing countries also participated meaningfully .
. .” (Ibid., p. 643). Consequently, past and present efforts
made by international accords to address climate change

Cities as Catalysts for Climate Action
With state-led international efforts unable to curtail GHG
emissions in a substantive, uniform fashion, and globalization challenging the Westphalian state-centric geopolitical system, the terrains of global governance and green
diplomacy have changed dramatically over a handful of
decades. This has allowed multiple non-state and subnational actors to occupy the new political spaces that are
emerging relative to climate action. Certainly this is nothing new given coalitions of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) dedicated to environmental issues have been
active and increasing in influence since climate change
first gained international attention during the latter part of
the 20th century (Bouteligier, 2011). In the United States
alone, sub-national actors have become increasingly
relevant as exemplified by a 2007 coalition of American
states that sued the Bush administration for its inability to
appropriately regulate GHG emissions under the Clean
Air Act (Selin & Van Dever, 2010). The most active subnational forces for climate management and planning,
however, appear to be cities given more and more urban
areas are “reworking traditional hierarchal models of
global climate governance by creating their own climate
change programs” (Rice, 2013, p. 1). The development of this trend is reflexively linked to a complex web of
environmental problems such as climate change that Toly
(2011) claims are increasingly becoming “conditioned by
the idiosyncrasies of the production, distribution, and consumption of wealth in cities. This relationship occasions
the urbanization of global environmental governance” (p.
142). Toly’s assessment undergirds the idea cities are no
longer constrained to local environmental considerations,
but are instead altering the types and complexities of envi-

have been uneven at best.
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ronmental issues faced by communities worldwide.

for bringing about any necessary reductions in these
emissions. Many [municipal] governments have con-

There are unique factors that make cities more effective

siderable authority over land use planning and waste

than state and international coalitions when it comes to

management and can play an important role in dealing

global environmental governance. To begin, ecological

with transportation issues and energy consumption (p.

crises are usually dynamic and reflect complex relation-

141).

ships that exist between the built and natural environment.
Karkkainen (2004) argues that for this reason state and

Karkkainen (2004) adds environmental problems require

international entities are ill-equipped to provide solutions,

local, adaptive management strategies which use place-

since they tend toward formulating rigid, highly prescriptive

based approaches built on “principles of continuous

rules rather than flexible strategies capable of mitigating

experimentation and dynamic adjustment in response to . .

fluid environmental problems. Further, international pacts

. new information, changing conditions, and the observed

to reduce GHG emissions do not account for the realities

effects of past management efforts” (p. 79). This gover-

of multiple causation and location specific tendencies, nor

nance structure aligns well with urban leaders who can

do they allow for flexible policymaking that can be easily

quickly and effectively tailor their climate agendas to local

adjusted outside of the international arena; rather, they rely

particularities, a policymaking formula absent from state

on “one size fits all” emissions standards that attempt to

and internationally directed plans. Finally, global treaties

shoebox climate action into a singular agreement (Gupta,

like the Kyoto Protocol are not legally binding agreements,

2010). On one hand, this sort of limited, command-style

thus they are incapable of exerting tangible influence on

approach to problem solving is reflective of the Westpha-

urban and market stakeholders capable of making or

lian geopolitical model in that it assumes risk control on

breaking climate change agendas. In contrast, cities and

a transnational scale is best mediated by state players.

municipal leaders can “facilitate direct action in response

On the other hand, it accentuates the need for a post-

to climate change by fostering partnerships with relevant

Westphalian style of governance that recognizes effective

stakeholders, encouraging public participation, and lob-

climate action will not be solved by statist policies alone,

bying national governments” (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2006, p.

but will instead be resolved as a consequence of state and

143).

local actors working in concert.
Another reason why cities are ascending the ranks of
Cities, in contrast to the international community they are

global environmental governance is they are practically

a part of, are more proximal to the contributors and causal

unmatched as engines of economic production, and can

agents of global climate change, and are better suited to

generate the capital necessary to influence both national

succeed where state coalitions have failed. As noted by

and transnational polities. Their ability to create wealth

Betsill and Bulkeley (2006), the issue of climate change is

is largely because they serve as hubs for industrial output

best handled by municipal leaders that can attune policy

and commodities exchange, and contribute heavily to

and mitigation efforts to the unique site-specific factors

international trade streams. It is also due to deep connec-

responsible for climate change:

tions cities have to their surrounding geographies which

GHG emissions originate from processes that are
embedded in specific places, and it is often argued that
the local is the most appropriate political jurisdiction
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provide labor pools and sources of material inputs for the

reform urban land-use, transit, energy, housing, and waste

creation of goods (Corfee-Morlot et al., 2009). Accord-

systems. There is also a call for municipalities to actively

ingly, Dierwechter (2013) argues it is more accurate to

lobby state and federal governments to adopt legislation

describe cities and their neighboring territories as ‘city-re-

supportive of and complementary to local climate action.

gions’ defined by a complex array of interlacing economic,

Approximately 1,000 cities are currently participating in

transportation, industrial, cultural, and sociopolitical

the MCPA, making it the signature sub-national climate

systems. The end result of this configuration is city-regions

action movement in the United States (Ibid.).

represent agglomerate economies that not only comprise
the bulk of their respective nation’s output and labor devel-

Along with domestic measures taken by U.S. urban lead-

opment, but are also key regimes in the global economy.

ers, international networks of cities are also making

This is evidenced by the fact that in many Organization for

significant contributions. The C40 Cities Climate Leader-

Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) coun-

ship Group is one such assemblage, and is comprised of

tries – Norway, Japan, and France as examples – a single

58 major metropolitan regions that combined account for

metro-region is responsible for producing one-third to

18% of the world’s gross domestic product. This powerful

one-half of its nation’s GDP (Corfee-Morlot et al., 2009).

coalition has adopted a collaborative approach to ad-

This robust contribution to state and global economies,

dressing climate change as shown by its involvement in

along with an expansive, uneven geography, rejects

4,734 collective actions aimed at developing state-of-the-

traditional assessments that cities are locally fixed, neatly

art technologies and urban planning projects that can be

demarcated zones, and presents them instead as large,

utilized worldwide including:

densely populated areas affected by and affecting a larger
tier of national and international processes. As such, cities

•

energy sources rather than fossil fuels

have the economic, social, and political wherewithal necessary to influence climate action on a global scale.

Low-carbon building designs reliant on renewable

•

Enhanced public health infrastructures capable of serving vulnerable communities affected by climate change

With the economic and political influence necessary to be-

•

Zero waste strategies centered around recycling, com-

come crucial players in emissions governance, cities have

posting, and the use of waste by-products as inputs for

wasted no time in asserting themselves. This is best dem-

industrial processes

onstrated in the United States where dissatisfaction with a

•

Education and outreach programs counseling individu-

tepid federal response to GHG mitigation has spurred city

als and firms on what specific steps they can take to

leaders to take action. The methodologies urban spaces

lessen their emissions footprint

are utilizing to influence climate action are quite varied,
yet Segbers (2011) identifies networks of municipalities as

Equally impressive to these activities is the C40 members’

the main channel by which the urbansphere is engaging

commitment to sharing knowledge, assets, and technical

in global climate governance. According to Dierwech-

expertise to non-member cities and national governments

ter (2010), a prime example is the U.S. Mayors Climate

(C40, 2013). Much like the United States’ MCPA partici-

Protection Agreement (MCPA) which was drafted in 2005

pants, the C40 group is emblematic of the new leadership

by then Seattle mayor Greg Nickels. This plan calls upon

roles city-regions are taking relative to implementing ag-

mayors from all fifty states to reduce GHGs to 7% below
1990 levels as originally targeted by the Kyoto Protocol.
Elements of this plan include broad-based directives to
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gressive climate planning. Moreover, the C40’s emphasis

political strife and generalized apathy that has often pre-

on knowledge diffusion across state boundaries highlights

cluded states from making meaningful progress toward

the ability of cities to influence international regimes.

reducing GHG emissions. This should come as no surprise

These supra-national networks are not only indicative

since the atmosphere as a political space is not immune to

of how emissions control measures and climate change

politicized science, or competing market interests that resist

initiatives are proliferating at the municipal level, they also

constraints to economic and industrialized development. In

suggest the atmosphere is becoming deeply embedded in

terms of the former, a skeptical public has often emerged

all aspects of urban politics and planning.

who is unwilling to support environmentally driven initiatives viewed as too costly (Selin & Van Dever, 2010). In the

Rice (2011) contends that if cities are to continue mak-

case of the latter, a hostile business regime develops that

ing significant inroads in the realm of environmental

attempts to subvert government controls by lobbying against

governance, they must align public sector strategies to

climate-based projects. Other stumbling blocks faced

the interests of private firms and individuals. This means

by cities involve constraints imposed by fiscal stress (Rice,

municipalities must actively target businesses and citizens

2011). This has become increasingly problematic over the

with education based, market driven solutions. Allman et

past decade as multiple financial crises have cast ripples of

al. (2004) report this has proven true in the United King-

unemployment and market collapse across the entire global

dom where local authorities having the most success in ad-

community. Cash strapped cities struggling to keep afloat

dressing climate change are those who effectively increase

are often unable to participate in meaningful climate plan-

public awareness of the secondary benefits of reducing

ning (Allman et al., 2004), a reality difficult to escape given

GHG emissions, including green employment opportuni-

the monumental costs involved in reconfiguring petroleum-

ties, improved livability, and independence from fossil

based transportation and industrial infrastructures into

fuels. In the Unites States, Seattle has rolled out several

carbon-friendly ones. Consequently, fiscally delimited

marketing campaigns to inform its citizens as to the health,

metro-regions must wait on the sidelines until a positive

economic, and environmental benefits of energy-efficiency

swing in the economy boosts their capital resources.

measures and alternative transportation (Rice, 2011). In
essence, cities are creatively finding ways to initiate smart

Dierwechter and Wessells (2013) posit another hurdle faced

climate planning by using economic motivators backed

by cities is the conflicting attitudes lurking between urban

by scientific reasons. Politically these mechanisms have

cores and their suburban neighbors. In this case, disparate

a number of benefits for local authorities: first, they en-

environmental priorities between the two often create an

gage citizens and private enterprises in a non-compulsory

asymmetrical political framework where suburban apathy

fashion that lowers resistance to climate initiatives; second,

undermines the climate agendas of metropolitan leaders.

they expand knowledge across all fronts relative to threats

This is due largely to suburbia’s continued indulgence in

posed by atmospheric warming; finally, they incentivize

post-Fordist development strategies that emphasize outward

businesses to become willing participants by expounding

expansion, strip zoning, and automobile-driven transporta-

the financial gains of greener communities. Ultimately, the

tion schemes. It is also due to disconcerting fiscal inequi-

sum effect is municipalities are able to move forward with

ties embedded within metropolitan regions where “wealthy

new and novel forms of climate management.

communities pick and choose the climate initiatives that

Despite the growing role cities are playing in global
climate governance, they are still vulnerable to the same

11

best suit their economic purposes, and less wealthy [ones]

erating most of the world’s GHG emissions – a tendency

struggle to articulate and implement . . . ‘green’ rationales

that is likely going to intensify in the coming decades given

for new forms of growth and municipal function” (Ibid., p.

the rising trends in urbanization and population concen-

1382). These discontinuities in prioritization and political

tration occurring worldwide (Corfee-Morlot et al., 2009).

will present novel obstacles for effective climate change

This suggests cities will need to better manage their own

management, and will require inter-municipal efforts

urban infrastructures if they are to jump scale and become

capable of bridging the divide between forward thinking

world leaders dedicated to sustainability and sound eco-

urban leaders and free-riding municipalities. Failure to do

logical stewardship.

so means urban initiatives dedicated to climate planning
and emissions management will be grossly handicapped
by those communities unwilling to a) coordinate effective
climate agendas with their neighbors, and/or b) curb their
appetites for unfettered material consumption, expanded
spatial growth, and automobile-intensive transportation
networks.
Inter-municipal political differences aside, there is also the
question of whether all metro-regions are equally competent in effectively managing climate initiatives. This is currently an unresolved question due to the relative newness
of cities as leaders in formulating sound climate action, as
well as the diversity of city types – fishing, agrarian, hightech, etc. – posing different urban management challenges
(Dierwechter, 2013). Also, while several city networks are
committed to reducing GHG emissions, there is the reality
that cities are unparalleled sinks for natural resources,
parasitizing outlying regions both locally and abroad for
the material goods needed for survival. In terms of the
transportation sector alone, Toly (2011) points out:
Industrial and post-industrial urban metabolisms require
significant amounts of energy delivered in the form of
electricity . . . heat, and fuel for transportation. Sustaining contemporary urban agglomerations requires
not only the depletion of non-renewable energy sources, but also the appropriation of such sources from
distant and vulnerable landscapes and communities (p.
143).
Another distinction of cities is they are responsible for gen-

Conclusion
Globalization and climate change have brought with them
winds of change that are threatening the grip of a centuries old, state-centric system of global governance. Should
this trend continue, the world’s community of nations may
well be in a post-Westphalian transition where sub-national
actors such as cities become dynamic forces that forever
alter the landscape of global politics and power. Evidence
of this is already abundant, considering city-regions are
filling the leadership void formed by nations unwilling or
unable to adopt innovative climate goals. Yet despite
their promise to become frontrunners in conceptualizing and initiating effective environmental planning, cities
will need to answer many questions related to their own
political economies and systems management. Changes
will certainly need to occur as it relates to their contribution to emissions pollution, as well as to the asymmetrical
alignment of municipal priorities that preclude cities from
drafting uniform climate goals. Perhaps most importantly,
metro-regions will need to abate a troubling propensity for
draining local and foreign regions of their natural resources, and embrace a more holistic urban metabolism that
better manages material and energy flows.
On a macro scale, the global community will need to
come to terms with the new roles cities are playing in
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green international relations. It will also mean concretizing the capabilities and appropriate roles for cities vis-àvis global environmental governance. For example, are
cities located in diverse corners of the world capable of
mediating and resolving planetary-scale ecological crises
affecting all peoples? What should the relationship of city
efforts be in respect to those at the state level, and what is
the most effective politics of scale for addressing climate
change? Finally, can cities and states co-exist and forge
collaborative resolutions, or are their goals incompatible?
These questions are indicative of the uncertain crossroads
the international community stands upon as it tries to make
sense of globalization’s new world order. Yet one thing
seems certain: we are witnessing the birth of a new type of
green internationalism where cities as agents of environmental planning are becoming every bit as important as
the nations they reside in.
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